War Studies Program
Learn the theory, practice, organization, and control of war and military forces.
This War Studies Advanced Program will introduce students to the theory and practice of civil-military relations in the twentieth century. It will examine the civic, ethical, and evolving legal basis of civilian control over the military; the relationship between commanders and presidents; the relationship between Congress, presidents, and commanders; and the impact of these systemic factors on military success.
War Studies Advanced Programs are open only to alumni of the basic War Studies course. These sessions are offered in the winter and summer, and focus either on a national security challenge or on a historical conflict. Learn more about the War Studies Program.
Images courtesy Harry S. Truman Library | NARA
Kim Kagan on the importance of military history
Faculty
James M. Dubik
LTG James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War and a Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. General Dubik has extensive operational experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Bosnia, Haiti, Panama, Honduras, and in many NATO countries.
James M. Dubik
LTG James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War and a Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. General Dubik has extensive operational experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Bosnia, Haiti, Panama, Honduras, and in many NATO countries.
His last job on active duty was as Commanding General of the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq during the Surge of 2007–2008. He is a member of the U.S. Army Ranger Hall of Fame and a distinguished member of the U.S. Army 75th Ranger Regiment.
General Dubik taught Philosophy at West Point and Campaign Theory and Practice at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has completed an MIT fellowship program for national security studies as well as executive programs in national security at Harvard’s JFK School of Government and Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. He is the author, most recently, of Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory.
He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Philosophy from Gannon University, Erie, Pennsylvania; a Masters in Military Arts and Sciences from the Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Johns Hopkins University.
Frederick W. Kagan
Frederick W. Kagan is a Senior Instructor with the Hertog War Studies Program at the Institute for the Study of War. The author of the 2007 report “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq,” he is one of the intellectual architects of the successful “surge” strategy in Iraq. He is the director of AEI’s Critical Threats Project.
Frederick W. Kagan
Frederick W. Kagan is a Senior Instructor with the Hertog War Studies Program at the Institute for the Study of War. The author of the 2007 report “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq,” he is one of the intellectual architects of the successful “surge” strategy in Iraq. He is the Robert H. Malott Chair and Director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).
In 2009, he served in Kabul, Afghanistan, as part of General Stanley McChrystal’s strategic assessment team, and he returned to Afghanistan in 2010, 2011, and 2012 to conduct research for Generals David Petraeus and John Allen. In July 2011, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen awarded him the Distinguished Public Service Award, the highest honor the Chairman can present to civilians who do not work for the Department of Defense, for his volunteer service in Afghanistan.
He is coauthor of the report Defining Success in Afghanistan (AEI and the Institute for the Study of War, 2010) and author of the series of reports Choosing Victory (AEI), which recommended and monitored the US military surge in Iraq. His most recent book is Lessons for a Long War: How America Can Win on New Battlefields (AEI Press, 2010, with Thomas Donnelly). Previously an associate professor of military history at West Point, Dr. Kagan is a contributing editor at the Weekly Standard and has written for Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and other periodicals.
He holds a Ph.D. from Yale University in Russian and Soviet military history.
Kimberly Kagan
Kimberly Kagan is a Senior Instructor with the Hertog War Studies Program and founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War. She is a military historian who has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yale, Georgetown, and American University.
Kimberly Kagan
Kimberly Kagan is a Senior Instructor with the Hertog War Studies Program and founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War. She is a military historian who has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yale, Georgetown, and American University.
Dr. Kagan served in Kabul for seventeen months from 2010 to 2012 working for commanders of the International Security Assistance Force, General David H. Petraeus and subsequently General John Allen. Admiral Mike Mullen, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized Dr. Kagan for this deployment as a volunteer with the Distinguished Public Service Award, the highest honor the Chairman can present to civilians who do not work for the Department of Defense.
Dr. Kagan previously served as a member of General Stanley McChrystal’s strategic assessment team, comprised of civilian experts, during his campaign review in June and July 2009. She conducted many regular battlefield circulations of Iraq between May 2007 and April 2010 while General Petraeus and General Raymond T. Odierno served as the MNF-I Commanding General.
Dr. Kagan held an Olin Postdoctoral Fellowship in Military History at Yale International Security Studies in 2004 to 2005 and was a National Security Fellow at Harvard’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies in 2002 to 2003. She received her B.A. in Classical Civilization and her Ph.D. in History from Yale University.
Download the Full Syllabus
Preview the Syllabus by Week/Session
Origins and Dimensions of the American Civil-Military Relationship, Part I
Readings:
- Title X and Title 50
- Title 10 U.S. Code Assignments:
- Sections 113,114, 118. 123a, 123b, 131, 151-155, 161-165, 167, 311-312, 331-334, all of Chapter 18, 948b
- Read also Title 50 U.S. Code Assignments:
- Sections 3002 and 3043 (This is from the National Security Act of 1947 giving the intent of Congress)
- Title 10 U.S. Code Assignments:
- Matthew Moten, Presidents and Their Generals: An American History of Command in War, Introduction
- Anderew J. Polsky, Elusive Victories: The American Presidency at War, Introduction and Ch. 1
- Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Introduction and Ch. 4
- Russell F. Weigley, “The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: a Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present,” in Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, editors, Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security
Discussion Questions:
- Who is responsible for what according to Constitutional and legal grounds?
- What are the central points of contention in American civil-military relations?
- Can these points of contention be readily resolved? What are each author’s perspectives? Upon what issues do they agree?
- Upon which do they disagree, and why?
Origins and Dimensions of the American Civil-Military Relationship, Part II
Readings:
- Dale R. Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush, pp. 1-22
- Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command, Chs. 6-7
- Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, Introduction, Chs. 1-2
- Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, “The Gap and What It Means for American National Security,” in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security
- Richard Betts, “Are Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem?’ in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, editors, American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a new Era
- Christopher P. Gibson, “Enhancing National Security and Civilian Control of the Military,” in American Civil- Military Relations
Discussion Questions:
- What is the best framework within which to understand civil-military relations?
- What is the purpose of asking how the military should relate to civilian authority?
- To what extent is the friction between civil and military leaders a matter of personality, experience, institutional background, or structure? (Before you simply say, “some combination of all of the above, be prepared to identify the friction that emanates from each of these elements.)
- How do you compare and contrast Cohen’s and Feaver’s approaches?
- How does each differ from Huntington’s objective control model?
- How do you assess the strengths and weaknesses of Cohen’s, Feaver’s, and Gibson’s approaches?
- What are the purposes of the civil-military relationship?
Case I: World War II
Readings:
- Matthew Moten, Presidents and Their Generals, Ch. 8
- Dale Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency, Ch. 2
- Anderew J. Polsky, Elusive Victories, Ch. 3
- Mark A. Stoler, George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century, Preface and Chs. 5-7
- David Kaiser, No End Save Victory: How FDR Led the Nation into War, Introduction, Chs. 1, 3-5
Discussion Questions:
- Does American success in World War II demonstrate that civil-military relations during that conflict were good?
- How would you characterize the World War II civil-military relationship between the president and his senior military subordinates?
- What are the relationship’s personal dimensions and what are its organizational dimensions? In what ways are the two related?
- How did the alliance aspect of World War II impact the personal and organizational dimensions of the relationship?
- How would you assess the strengths and weaknesses of this relationship?
- Where were the friction points, and how were they mitigated, if they were?
Case II: The Vietnam War
Readings:
- Matthew Moten, Presidents and Their Generals, Ch. 10
- Dale Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency, Ch. 6
- H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, Chs. 5, 7, 14, and 15
- Andrew J. Polsky, Elusive Victories, Ch. 4
- Richard Kohn, “Building Trust: Civil-Military Behaviors for Effective National Security,” in Suzanne Nielsen and Don Snider, editors, American Civil-Military Relations: The soldier and the State in a New Era
Discussion Questions:
- To what extent did poor civil-military relations contribute to the mistakes that led to American involvement and defeat in Vietnam?
- What were the pathologies exhibited in the civil-military relationship of the Johnson administration?
- Which were personality-based and which institutions-based?
- Which were “normal” behaviors of bureaucracies, and which went well beyond “normal”?
- What checks and balances were in place to mitigate thee behaviors?
- Why didn’t they work, or did they?
- What are the potential positive and negative consequences of the resignation of a senior military leader?
- Is resignation ever a legitimate option? If so, under what conditions; if not, why not?
Goldwater-Nichols and its Impact
The First Gulf War
Readings:
- Matthew Moten, Presidents and Their Generals, Ch. 11
- Dale Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency, Ch. 11
- Marvin and Deborah Kalb, Haunting Legacy: Vietnam and the American Presidency from Ford to Obama, Ch. 5
- George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, Chs. 17-19
- Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, Preface, Chs. 2 and 19, Epilogue
Discussion Questions:
- Did America’s stunning success in the Gulf War demonstrate the restoration of “proper” civil-military relations?
- What was the strategic context withing which the First Gulf War was fought, and what were the strategic controversies about that context?
- What are the potential positive and negative aspects of the civil-military relationships that existed leading up to the war?
- How did these play out during the war, and how did they factor into the war’s end?
- In what ways were the pathologies of the Vietnam era healed, and in what way were they not? Were any new pathologies evident?
