Generalship

Readings:

• Major-General J.F.C. Fuller. Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure, a Study of the Personal Factor in Command. (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1936), pp. 1- 96
• Carl von Clausewitz. On War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Book 1, Chapter 3, “Genius” and Book VIII, Chapters 1, “Introduction,” 2, “Absolute and Real War,” and Chapter 6, A & B, “The Effect of the Political Aim on the Military Objective” and “War Is An Instrument of Policy.” Michael Howard and Peter Paret, translators. pp. 100-112, 577- 581, and 603-610

Watch: 

Once an Eagle

Discussion Questions:

1. How Clausewitz and Fuller define and describe generalship. Where the two agree and disagree.
2. Whether Clausewitz’s and Fuller’s understanding of generalship admit to different types of generals. If not why not, and what are the implications? If so, why, and what are the implications?
3. A “model of generalship” from Clausewitz’s and Fuller’s?
4. How Sam Damon and Courtney Massengale compare to the Clausewitz/Fuller model.

Grant at Vicksburg

Readings: 

1. Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs (New York: Da Capo Press, 1952 edition). The campaign against Vicksburg, chapters 30-39. pp. 219-308
2. F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (New York: Da Capo Press, 1958 edition). Chapters VII and VIII, “Advance on Vicksburg” and “Vicksburg Campaign.” pp. 117-158
3. Map: Campaign for Vicksburg
4. Animated Map: Vicksburg Campaign

Discussion Questions:

1. The Vicksburg Campaign as an example of war at the operational level.
   1. Did the campaign have clear, achievable operational objectives that, if attained, would achieve specified strategic aim(s), or are the objectives and aims vague, conflicting, or in some other way ambiguous? Was the campaign based upon a sufficiently accurate understanding of the enemy; the overall military-political situation—domestic, regional, and international; and the actual conditions under which the campaign must be carried out? Was the campaign an expression of a coherent, unitary vision of the commander? Were the parts of the campaign—the tactical battles and engagements, maneuver scheme, logistics, command and control, and communications—means toward achieving the campaign’s end? Were the assumptions upon which the campaign plan was built valid? To paraphrase Mao, just as the cobbler should shape the shoe to fit the foot so as to allow a person to walk well, the campaign plan should fit the specifics of the situation so as to attain its portion of the strategic aim(s).
   2. Were there a sufficient number of forces, of the right type? (Note: “Sufficient” is the term is the term used throughout, not maximum or optimal or ideal. No commander ever has all that he or she needs, regardless of the resource.) Were the forces sufficiently trained, equipped, and led? Was the staff system adequate to the tasks of planning, preparing, executing, and adapting the organizations employed? Were the major subordinate leaders sufficiently prepared, did they understand the whole of the plan and their part in it? Were these leaders competent enough to do what was expected of them? Did the campaign “fit” the actual geographically? Were the systems designed to support the campaign—intelligence, fires, logistics, transport, and communications—adequate to their tasks? Was the resource of “time” adequately considered? Did senior political leaders have a feasible plan for creating and sustaining sufficient societal and political will to support the campaign?
   3. Did the leaders of the campaign have credibility within their forces, among subordinate and senior leaders, and with political leadership? Were there in-place, workable and reliable processes, organizations, and technical means necessary to gather information, understand that information, make decisions, observe how the decisions play out on the battlefields, and adapt to unfolding events at least as fast, or faster, than the enemy? (Again, not ideal, sufficient.) What effect, if any, did the political situation have on the way the campaign was planned and executed?
   4. (Remember: The whole of a campaign is greater than its parts. And, not all campaigns are autonomous; some are nested within other campaigns. A campaign, for example, may lay the foundation for a follow on campaign. Or two campaigns may be conducted simultaneously where progress, or lack thereof, in one affects the other. “Nested campaigns” are examples of campaigns that must be both internally and externally coordinated.)  Did the campaign’s constituent parts fit together into a coherent whole? Was the campaign nested among other campaigns? If so, (a) how was it supposed to be related to these others, and does it relate in the ways intended; (b) how did the senior commanders and staff of each campaign in communicate with each other; and (c) since campaigns are political-military activities, how did the campaign fit with political aims, strategies, and policies?
2. The differences between Grant’s and Fuller’s accounts of the Vicksburg campaign.
3. Grant’s responsibilities at the operational level compared to the commanding generals at the tactical level.
4. The relationship of Grant’s generalship during the Vicksburg campaign to the Clausewitz/Fuller model.

The 1864-65 Campaigns

Readings:

• Horace Porter, Campaigning With Grant (New York: Mallard Press, 1991). Chapter III, “Preparations for a General Advance.” pp. 35-55
• Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs (New York: Da Capo Press, 1952 edition). Chapter 50-58. pp. 391-482
• F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (New York: Da Capo Press, 1958 edition). Part III, Grant as General-in-Chief, Chapters X-XIV. pp. 209-332
• Animated Map of the Main Effort of the ’64-65 Campaigns, the Overland Campaign.
• Map: #45 from the West Point Atlas of the American Civil War

Discussion Questions:

1. The differences between Vicksburg and the 1864-65 campaigns, the reasons for these differences, and the changes in Grant’s responsibilities and generalship—in planning, execution, coordination; in maneuver, mobility, logistics, communications, command and control, and relationships.
2. A comparison of Grant’s “leadership space” during Vicksburg to that of 1864-65.
3. The adequacy of the Clausewitz/Fuller model and any required adjustments to that

 Lincoln and the National Level

Readings:

• Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983), Chapter 4, “High Command and Organization,” and Chapter 5, Union Logistics and Strategy.” pp. 101-152
• James M. McPherson, Tried By War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief (New York: the Penguin Press, 2008), Introduction and Chapters 1, 7-9. pp. 1-36 and 161-230
• Matthew Moten, Presidents & Their Generals (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), Chapter 6, “Lincoln and Grant.” pp. 153-168

Discussion Questions:

1. Responsibilities of generalship at the national level and how these responsibilities are
2. Comparison of actions of generalship at the national level to generalship during Vicksburg and during the 1864-65 Campaigns.
3. The civil responsibilities for the conduct of war at the national level and how these responsibilities are related to and coordinated with the military responsibilities.
4. Whether the civil and military responsibilities are strongly role differentiated.
5. The adequacy of the Clausewitz/Fuller model; the adjustments necessary to match the model to real generalship.

Kasserine Pass

Readings: 

• Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002). Chapter 9, Kasserine,” pp. 338-392
• Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America’s First Battles: 1776-1965 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), Chapter 8, “Kasserine Pass, 30 Juanuary-22 February 1943,” by Martin Blumenson. pp. 226-267
• Mark Perry, Partners in Command (New York: the Penguin Press, 2007). Chapters 7, “Kasserine,” pp. 158-184
• Stephen Budiansky, “Triumph at Kasserine Pass”
• Dwight Jon Zimmerman, “Command Failure: Lloyd Fredendall and the Battle of Kasserine”

Discussion Questions:

1. What happened at Kasserine, and the context within which Kasserine took place.
2. The level of war at which Fredendall operated, his responsibilities at Kasserine Pass, and his generalship.
3. A comparison of generalship: Grant at Vicksburg and Fredendall at Kasserine.
4. The utility of the Clausewitz/Fuller model.

The Campaigns for North Africa

Readings: 

• Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1948). Chapters 5-8, pp. 74-158
• Joseph P. Hobbs, Dear General: Eisenhower’s Wartime Letters to Marshall (Baltimore, MD: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). Chapter 3, “Commanding in the Mediterranean, November, 1942-December 1943,” pp. 61- 108
• Mark Perry, Partners in Command (New York: the Penguin Press, 2007). Chapters 6, “Torch,” pp. 131-157
• Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower, A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), Chapters 31-35 from “A General’s Education: The Mediterranean, 1942-43.” pp. 360-428

Watch: 

The Big Picture: Battle of North Africa

Discussion Questions:

1. The overall structure of the set of military actions that constituted the Campaigns for North Africa.
2. The commonalities and differences between Grant’s responsibilities and generalship in the 1864-65 campaigns and Eisenhower in North Africa.
3. The demands of coalition warfare on Eisenhower’s responsibilities and generalship on planning, execution, coordination; in maneuver, mobility, logistics, communications, command and control, and relationships.
4. Describing Eisenhower’s “leadership space” during in North Africa.
5. The adequacy of the Clausewitz/Fuller model; further adjustments necessary to match the model to actual requirements.

Marshall and FDR

Readings:

• Mark A. Stoler, George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1989). Preface, pages ix-x. Chapters 5 “Preparing for the Unpreparable,” and 6, “”The Struggle for a Unified Global Strategy.” pp. 68-108
• Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942 (New York: Viking Press, 1965). Chapter XVIII, “End of the Beginning,” pp. 398-427
• Matthew Moten, Presidents & Their Generals (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), Chapter 8, “Roosevelt, Marshall, and Hopkins,” pp. 186-224
• David Kaiser, No End Save Victory: How FDR Led the Nation to War (New York: Basic Books, 2014). Chapter 7, “Toward World War, June-August 1941,” and 8, “Planning for Victory, August-November 1941.” pp. 233-306
• Jonathan W. Jordan, American Warlords: How Roosevelt’s High Command Led America to Victory in World War II (New York: the Penguin Press, 2015). Chapters 1, 2, 5, 7, 15-17, and 23

Watch: 

The Century: America’s Time, 1941-1945

Discussion Questions:

1. Responsibilities during a world war of generalship at the national level and how these responsibilities are coordinated
2. Comparison and relationship of actions of generalship at the national level to generalship at Kasserine and during the Campaigns for North Africa
3. The civil responsibilities for the conduct of war at the national level and how these responsibilities are related to and coordinated with the military responsibilities
4. Whether the civil and military responsibilities are strongly role differentiated
5. The adequacy of the Clausewitz/Fuller model; further adjustments necessary to match the model to actual requirements

The Main Military Effort: the Counter Offensive

Readings:

• Kimberly Kagan, The Surge: A Military History (New York: Encounter Books, 2009), pp. xi- 204

Watch: 

Overview of Iraq War up to 2007

Maps:

Iraq

• Map of Iraq with important locations
• Iraq in region with major roads
• Political map of Iraq

Baghdad

• City Districts
• Ethnic and religious neighborhoods pre-2006
• Ethnic and religious neighborhoods before and after 2006-07 sectarian violence

Discussion Questions:

1. Odierno’s campaign plan in the detail done for Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign.
2. The similarities and differences between Odierno’s responsibilities and generalship and that of Grant’s and Fredendall’s.
3. The applicability of the Clausewitz/Fuller model, with adaptations, to Odierno’s generalship.

Supporting Efforts: Defeating AQI and the Iraqi Surge

Readings:

• General Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task (New York: the Penguin Group, 2013). Chapters 7-15, pp. 89-272
• Lieutenant General James Dubik, “Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity, Iraq as a Primer;” “Creating Police and Law Enforcement Systems;” and “Operational Art in Counterinsurgency, A View from the Inside” (Washington, D.C.: the Institute for the Study of War, 2009, 2010, and 2012)
• Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” pp. 7-40

Discussion Questions: 

1. McChrystal’s counter-terrorist campaign and how it changed over time.
2. Dubik’s “campaign,” if it can be called that.
3. The similarities and differences between Odierno’s responsibilities and generalship and that of McChrystal’s and Dubik’s.
4. The applicability of the Clausewitz/Fuller model, with adaptations, to McChrystal’s and Dubik’s generalship.

Petraeus, Crocker, and President Bush

Readings:

• Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012). Chapters 15-23, pp. 267-448
• George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publisher, 2010). Chapter 12, “Surge,” pp. 355-394
• Peter R. Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013). Chapters 6-8, pp. 148-232

Discussion Questions: 

1. The similarities and differences of Petraeus’ generalship as compared to Odierno’s, McChrystal’s, and Dubik’s.
2. The similarities and differences of Petraeus’ generalship as compared to Grant’s and Eisenhower’s.
3. Final conclusions on generalship.