Russia: What's Next?

Readings:

• George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947
• Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, Ch. 1
• Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, Chs. 1–3 

Discussion Questions:

1. What was the Cold War? Why did it end? How did it end?
2. How does Henry Kissinger explain the end of the Cold War? What are the rival explanations offered by Stephen Kotkin? How did Kennan prophesize that the Cold War would end?
3. What role did the U.S. play in the dissolution of the Soviet Union? How does Kissinger explain Reagan’s role?
4. How was the collapse of the Soviet Union experienced and perceived inside Russia? How did Russians explain what happened to their system?

Readings:

George H. W. Bush Policies toward Russia

• Jeffrey Engel, When the World Seemed New, 16–18, 22–23
• Michael McFaul and James Goldgeier, Power and Purpose, Ch. 2
• Richard Nixon, “How to Lose the Cold War,” Memo, March 1992

Discussion Questions:

1. What were the policies of the Bush 41 Administration towards newly-independent Russia following the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991? What were Washington’s priorities, and what did it choose not to prioritize?
2. What was Richard Nixon’s critique of this approach? Do you think it is fair?

Readings:

• Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interest, Summer 1989
• Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 813–26

Discussion Questions:

1. Kissinger and Fukuyama offer strikingly different predictions about what the post-Cold War future is likely to look like. What are their respective ideas? What are their respective implications for U.S. policy towards Russia? In hindsight, who made the better arguments? Who do you think was more persuasive at the time?
2. Anticipating Monday’s readings (hint: read ahead!), to what extent did the Clinton Administration follow either of these schools of thought in its own strategy and policy-making?

Readings:

Russia Policy under Clinton

• William J. Clinton, “The National Security Strategy of the United States – 1994,” Introduction and skim remainder for references to Russia
• Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, Chs. 2–4
• Kotkin, Chapters 5–7, Armageddon Averted (2001)
• William Burns, The Back Channel, Ch. 3

Discussion Questions:

1. The Clinton Administration came to office at a moment when the foreign policy framework that had guided the U.S. for the previous forty-plus years—the Cold War—was suddenly gone. What was the alternative vision it put forward in its 1994 National Security Strategy? How did Russia fit into that vision?
2. What were the instincts and policy priorities of the Clinton Administration towards Russia when it entered office? What was its strategy for pursuing them? To what extent did its approach differ from that of the George H. W. Bush Administration? What were the similarities?
3. Compare Strobe Talbott’s Washington-based account of Russia policy in the 1990s with Bill Burns’ account as a diplomat based in Moscow.
4. The U.S. had high hopes in the early 1990s for Russia’s evolution into a free market democracy. What went wrong? Who is to blame?
5. The Clinton Administration invoked a number of historical analogies to justify its Russia policy. What were they? What historical analogies did Russian leaders invoke to explain their experience in the 1990s?

Readings:

The NATO Expansion Debate

• Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership, Ch. 2
• George F. Kennan, “A Fateful Error—Expanding NATO Would Be a Rebuff to Russian Democracy,” The New York Times, February 5, 1997
• Henry Kissinger, “Expand NATO Now,” The Washington Post, December 19, 1994

The Serbian Revolution

• Michael Dobbs, “U.S. Advice Guided Milosevic Opposition,” The Washington Post, December 11, 2000

Clinton in Retrospect

• James Goldgeier, “Bill and Boris: A Window into the Most Important Post-Cold War Relationship,” Texas National Security Review, August 2018
• Stephen Kotkin, “The Bear Hug,” The New Republic, June 3, 2002

Discussion Questions:

1. One of the major flashpoints between the U.S. and Russia during the 1990s was the question of NATO expansion. What were the arguments for expanding NATO eastward? What were the arguments against? What were the alternatives? Imagine yourself as a decision-maker at the time: which course would you have supported?
2. What was the impact of developments in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s on the trajectory of U.S.-Russian relations? How did Russia react to U.S. intervention in Bosnia in 1995 versus Kosovo in 1999? What happened in Serbia in late 2000?
3. By the end of President Clinton’s term in office, U.S.-Russian relations had deteriorated. Why did this happen, in your view? To what extent was this a failure of American policy? How should the Clinton Administration be assessed for its handling of Russia?
4. How do we assess the Clinton Administration’s management of Russia?

Readings:

• Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000
• George W. Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002,” Executive Summary and Russia sections
• Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership, Chs. 3 and 5
• John McCain, “McCain Decries ‘New Authoritarianism in Russia,’” Senate Floor Statement, November 4, 2003
• Michael McFaul and James Goldgeier, “Putin’s Authoritarian Soul,” The Weekly Standard, February 28, 2005
• Peter Baker, “U.S. Warns Russia To Act More Like a Democracy,” The Washington Post, May 5, 2006

Discussion Questions:

1. How does Condoleezza Rice, writing on the eve of the 2000 election, characterize the Clinton Administration’s approach to Russia in the 1990s? What approach does she counsel instead?
2. What does the Bush Administration adopt as its Russia policy upon coming to office? To what extent did its policy change after 9/11—and if so, how? What did Bush hope to achieve with Russia? How was the Bush approach to Russia similar or different from that of President Clinton? Did he succeed? Was it the right approach?
3. How does the 2002 National Security Strategy talk about Russia? What are its assumptions about Russia and its place in the broader international order? How are these similar or different from the Clinton approach?

Readings:

• William Burns, The Back Channel, Ch. 6
• Peter Finn, “Outspoken Putin Critic Shot Dead,” The Washington Post, October 8, 2006
• Alan Cowell, “Russian Is Accused of Poisoning Ex-KGB Agent,” The New York Times, May 23, 2007
• Clifford Levy, “Putin’s Iron Grip Suffocates Opponents,” The New York Times, February 24, 2008
• C.J. Chivers, “Under Iron Hand of Russian Proxy, A Chechen Revival,” The New York Times, September 30, 2007
• Vladimir Putin, “Prepared Remarks at the 43^rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,” February 12, 2007
• Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Cuts Off Gas to Ukraine in Cost Dispute,” The New York Times, January 2, 2006
• Joshua Davis, “Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in the World,” Wired, August 21, 2007
• “Russia’s Booming Economy,” The Economist, June 8, 2007
• Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership, Ch. 7 
• William Burns, “Email to Secretary Rice—Russia Strategy,” The Back Channel
• Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, “Building on Common Ground with Russia,” The Washington Post, October 8, 2008
• Lindsey Graham and Joe Lieberman, “Russia’s Aggression is a Challenge to World Order,” Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2008

Discussion Questions:

1. What are the reasons for the deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations under President Bush? Was this downturn unavoidable? What is President Bush’s explanation for what happened? What is Bill Burns? What is Angela Stent’s?
2. What are some of the key changes in Russia during the 2000s under President Putin, politically and economically? What happens in Chechnya?
3. What are the manifestations of Russia’s increased international assertiveness in the mid-2000s? Did this reflect a fundamental shift of Russian foreign policy outlook? What explains them? How did the U.S. react to these actions by Russia?
4. What were the causes of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War? What was the relationship between events in the Balkans, the earlier Color Revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, and the conflict in Georgia? What was the role of the U.S. in the run-up to the conflict?
5. What are the competing views of the significance of the 2008 Georgia war offered by Kissinger, Stent and Lieberman-Graham? What are their respective recommendations and implications for U.S. policy following the war?

Readings:

The Reset

• Michael McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace, Chs. 6-8
• “An Open Letter to the Obama Administration From Central and Eastern Europe,” July 16, 2009
• “Obama Scraps Bush-Era Missile Defense for New Plan,” CNN, September 17, 2009
• Josh Gerstein, “Obama Announces New START Treaty,” Politico, March 26, 2010
• Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Ends Talk of Missile Sale to Iran,” The New York Times, September 22, 2010
• Glenn Kessler and Michael D. Shear, “Presidents Obama and Medvedev Bond at Ray’s Hell Burger,” The Washington Post, June 25, 2010
• Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy of the United States, 2010,” pp. 40–44

Libya

• Isabel Gorst, “Medvedev and Putin Clash Over Libya,” Financial Times, March 21, 2011
• Steven Lee Myers, “The Real Story Behind Putin’s Syria Strikes: Inside the Kremlin Rivalry that Radicalized Russia’s Strongman,” Politico, October 1, 2015

Russian Internal Developments (2011–2012)

• Julia Ioffe, “Net Impact: One Man’s Cyber Crusade Against Russian Corruption,” The New Yorker, April 11, 2011
• Will Englund and Kathy Lally, “Medvedev Confirms He Will Step Aside for Putin to Return to Russia’s Presidency,” The Washington Post, September 24, 2011
• Michael Schwirtz and David M. Herszenshorn, “Voters Watch Polls in Russia, and Fraud Is What They See,” The New York Times, December 5, 2011
• Elise Labott, “Clinton Cites ‘Serious Concerns’ about Russian Election,” CNN, December 6, 2011
• Ellen Barry, “Rally Defying Putin’s Party Draws Tens of Thousands,” The New York Times, December 10, 2011
• David M. Herszenhorn and Ellen Barry, “Putin Contends Clinton Incited Unrest Over Vote,” New York Times, December 8, 2011

Discussion Questions:

1. What was the Obama “reset” with Russia? What were its goals? Did it accomplish them? What did it not seek to accomplish? What were the criticisms of the reset, and to what extent do they think are valid? What were the alternative approaches that Obama might have taken upon taking office? Why do you think he chose the path he did?
2. What was the domestic political and economic situation in Russia at the time that Obama entered office? How do you think that influenced Russia’s response to the reset?
3. What role did the 2011 war in Libya play in shaping U.S.-Russian relations? How did the Russian leadership view the U.S.-led intervention there?
4. How did domestic developments in Russia in 2011 shape the U.S.-Russian relationship? How did the Obama Administration react to the 2011 protests following the Duma election? Why do you think this was the Obama approach, and was this the right response?

Readings:

U.S. Human Rights Policy

• David J. Kramer and Robert Kagan, “Give the Next Russian Ambassador a Powerful Tool to Guard Human Rights,” The Washington Post, October 11, 2011
• Samuel Charap, “Congress Deserves a Voice on Human Rights in Russia,” The Hill, June 22, 2011
• Steve Gutterman, “Russia Bars 18 Americans in Retaliation for Magnitsky List,” Reuters, April 13, 2013

Post-Reset Reflections… and What Next?

• Leon Aron, “The Putin Doctrine: Russia’s Quest to Rebuild the Soviet State,” Foreign Affairs, March 8, 2013
• Samuel Charap, “Beyond the Russian Reset,” The National Interest, June 25, 2013
• David M. Herszenhorn, “As U.S. Seeks Security Pact, Obama is Set to Meet Putin,” The New York Times, April 15, 2013
• Steven Lee Myers and David. M. Herszenhorn, “U.S.-Russian Diplomacy with a Personal Touch,” The New York Times, May 17, 2013
• Timothy Heritage and Steve Holland, “Russia Gives Snowden Asylum, Obama-Putin Summit in Doubt,” Reuters, August 1, 2013
• Jessica Yellin et al, “Obama Cancels Talks with Putin Ahead of G-20 Summit,” CNN, August 8, 2013

Discussion Questions:

1. What were the arguments for and against the Magnitsky Act? How did the Obama Administration react to the proposed legislation?
2. S.-Russian relations had deteriorated by the end of Obama’s first term. Why? Do you think this was inevitable for the U.S., or was it the consequence of mistakes on the part of Obama? If so, what was the alternative approach?
3. What were the possible approaches towards Russia for the Obama Administration as it began its second term? What approach did outgoing Secretary Clinton recommend? What path did Obama ultimately pursue? Did it work?

Readings:

Syria Diplomacy and the Red Line (2013)

• Yagil Beinglass and Daniel Brode, “Russia’s Syria Power Play,” The New York Times, January 30, 2012
• Joby Warrick, “More Than 1,400 Killed in Syria Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. says,” The Washington Post, August 30, 2013
• Mark Landler and Jonathan Weisman, “Obama Delays Syria Strike to Focus on a Russian Plan,” The New York Times, September 10, 2013
• Vladimir V. Putin, “A Plea for Caution from Russia,” The New York Times, September 11, 2013

Ukraine Explodes

• Shaun Walker, “Ukraine’s EU Trade Deal Will Be Catastrophic, Says Russia,” The Guardian, September 22, 2013
• “How The EU Lost Ukraine,” Der Spiegel, November 25, 2013
• David M Herszenhorn, “Thousands Protest Ukraine’s Rejection of Trade Pacts,” The New York Times, November 23, 2013
• Andrew Higgins and Andrew E. Kramer, “Ukraine Leader Was Defeated Even Before He Was Ousted,” The New York Times, January 3, 2015
• C.J. Chivers and David M. Herszenhorn, “In Crimea, Russia Showcases a Rebooted Army,” The New York Times, April 2, 2014
• David Sanger, The Perfect Weapon, Ch. 7
• “The European Reassurance Initiative,” CSIS, February 9, 2016
• Michele Flournoy, et al, “Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do,” Brookings | Atlantic Council report, 2015, p. 1–6
• Mark Landler et al, “Obama Steps Up Russia Sanctions in Ukraine Crisis,” The New York Times, March 20, 2014
• Patrick Reevell, “Obama Prolongs Sanctions on Russia,” ABC News, March 3, 2016
• Henry Kissinger, “To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End,” The Washington Post, March 5, 2014
• David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, “Reinforcing NATO’s Eastern Flank,” RAND, 2016

Syria Escalates (2014–2016)

• Jonathan Saul, “Russia Moves to Step Up Military Lifeline to Syria’s Assad,” Reuters, January 17, 2014
• Josh Rogin, “Inside Obama’s Secret Outreach to Russia,” Bloomberg, December 31, 2014
• Andrew Roth, et. al., “Russia Begins Airstrikes in Syria; U.S. Warns of New Concerns in Conflict,” The Washington Post, September 30, 2015
• Jackson Diehl, “Putin’s Model of Success,” The Washington Post, October 11, 2015
• Josh Rogin, “Obama’s Syria Plan Teams Up Russian and US Forces,” The Washington Post, July 13, 2016
• David Sanger, “Russia and the United States Reach New Agreement on Syria Conflict,” The New York Times, September 9, 2016
• Kathrin Hille, “Russia’s Middle East Ambitions Grow with Syria Battlefield Success,” Financial Times, January 19, 2017

Russia’s (New?) Worldview

• Vladimir Putin, Speech to the UN General Assembly, September 2015
• Peter Pomerantsev, “Russia and the Menace of Unreality: How Vladimir Putin Is Revolutionizing Information Warfare,” The Atlantic, September 9, 2014
• Christopher S. Chivvis, “Understanding Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’: And What Can Be Done About It,” Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, March 22, 2017

Discussion Questions:

1. What was Russia’s strategy in Syria from 2011 to 2014? What were its interests there? Conversely, how did Russia fit into the Obama Administration’s Syria policy, and how did Syria fit into its Russia policy? What were the alternative paths available to the Obama Administration? Why do you think it took the course it did?
2. What was the calculus behind the Russian offer to partner with the U.S. to remove Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile? How did the U.S. react? Was this the right choice?
3. What precipitated the crisis in Ukraine in late 2013 / early 2014? What role did the U.S. play? Could the crisis have been averted? Was it foreseeable?
4. What is the relationship between what happened in Ukraine in 2014 and what happened in Georgia in 2008? Or Kosovo in 1999? Or between Ukraine and Syria?
5. What is hybrid warfare? How does it work? How was it manifest in Ukraine in 2004 and Syria in 2015–2016?
6. Was Russia’s intervention in Ukraine a success, or a mistake, on Putin’s part? How should the answer to this question affect the U.S. response?
7. How did the Obama Administration react to the Ukraine crisis? How did U.S. allies react? What were some of the alternative policies it might have pursued, as described by Flournoy and Kissinger? Why did it pursue the path it did, as against the alternatives?
8. How did Russia escalate its involvement in Syria in late 2015? What was its strategy? Was it successful? Was Russia’s intensified involvement in Syria a sign of newfound strength or, as President Obama argued, an indication of weakness?
9. How did the U.S. respond to Russia’s escalation in Syria? What were the alternatives?

Readings:

Russia and the 2016 Election

• David Sanger, The Perfect Weapon, Ch. 8-10
• Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, “Report on the Investigation Into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election,” pp. 14–51

Four Views on “What Went Wrong”

• John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014
• Michael McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace, Ch. 24
• Stephen Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016
• James Kirchick, “Why It’s Hard to Take the Democrats Seriously on Russia,” Politico Magazine, July 24, 2017

Discussion Questions:

1. What were Russia’s reasons for its interference in the 2016 election? What was it trying to achieve? What precisely did it do?
2. How did the Obama Administration react to evidence of Russian interference in the 2016 election? What were the options available to it? Why did it pursue the path it did? Was this a mistake?
3. Mearsheimer, McFaul, Kotkin, and Kirchick offer competing explanations for, “What went wrong?” and, “Who is to blame?” in the collapse of U.S.-Russian relations between 2014 and 2016. What are their respective arguments? Who is most persuasive? If you are a U.S. policymaker, what are the implications of each analysis?

Readings:

The Trump Administration’s Russia Policy

• “Readout of President’s Call with Russian President Vladimir Putin,” The White House, January 28, 2017
• Elana Schor, “Republicans Warn Trump Against Lifting Russia Sanctions,” Politico, January 27, 2017
• Peter Baker, “Trump Signs Russia Sanctions Into Law, With Caveats,” The New York Times, August 2, 2017
• Tracy Wilkinson, “U.S. Decision to Provide Anti-Tank Weapons to Ukraine Angers Russian Leaders,” Los Angeles Times, December 26, 2017
• Philip Rucker et al, “Trump Administration Expels 60 Russian Officers…,” The Washington Post, March 26, 2018
• Courtney Weaver, “US Imposes Toughest Russia Sanctions to Date,” Financial Times, April 6, 2018
• “U.S., Russia Trade Threats on Syria Strikes,” The Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2018
• Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States
• Ryan Browne, “Trump’s Defense Strategy Sees China and Russia As Biggest Threats,” CNN, January 19, 2018
• Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “How a Four-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos Unfolded in Syria,” The New York Times, May 24, 2018
• “Donald Trump Calls for G7 to Readmit Russia Ahead of Summit,” The Guardian, June 9, 2018
• Yaroslav Trofimov, “At Putin’s Parade, Netanyahu Seeks Understanding on Iran,” The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2018
• Michael Gordon, “Trump Expected to Seek Putin’s Help to Curb Iran’s Military in Syria,” The Wall Street Journal, June 28, 2018
• Ben Caspit, “US, Russian, Israeli Security Chiefs to Meet in Jerusalem,” Al Monitor, June 14, 2019
• Michel Duclos, “Russia and Iran in Syria: A Random Partnership or an Enduring Alliance?” Atlantic Council Report, June 2019
• Andrew Kramer, “US Russia Talks Expose Deep Fissures,” The New York Times, May 14, 2019
• David Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “US Escalates Online Attacks on Russia’s Power Grid,” The New York Times, June 15, 2019
• Reuters, “EU Extends Economic Sanctions on Russia Until 2020,” June 21, 2019
• David Sanger and William Broad, “US Suspends Nuclear Arms Control Treaty with Russia,” The New York Times, February 1, 2019
• Elbridge Colby, “The INF Treaty Hamstrings the US; Trump Is Right to Leave It,” The Washington Post, October 23, 2018
• Frank Rose, “The End of an Era: INF Treaty, New START, and Strategic Stability,” Brookings Institution, February 12, 2019

China-Russia

• Yaroslav Trofimov, “The New Beijing-Moscow Axis,” The Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2019
• Neil MacFarquhar, “Xi Jinping’s Visit to Russia Accents Ties In Face of Tensions with US,” The New York Times, June 5, 2019
• Julia Ioffe, “What Putin Really Wants,” The Atlantic, January/February 2018

Closing Assessments

• Jeffrey Goldberg, Excerpt on Russia, “World Chaos and World Order: Conversations with Henry Kissinger,” The Atlantic, November 10, 2016
• Larry Diamond, “Russia and the Threat to Liberal Democracy: How Vladimir Putin is Making the World Safe for Autocracy,” The Atlantic, December 2016
• Edward Fishman and Mark Simakovsky, “The Do-No-Harm Principle of Kremlin Relations,” Foreign Policy, July 6, 2017
• Angela Stent, Putin’s World, Chs. 10-12
• Eugene Rumer, “Russia and the West in a New Standoff,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 14, 2017