U.S.-Russia Strategic Competition
Consider the nature of the Russian challenge to the United States.
Throughout this War Studies Advanced Program, students will examine the ways in which Vladimir Putin has used a number of different capabilities techniques and approaches, singly and in various combinations, to achieve his objectives. Students will consider information operations, cyber operations, the use of conventional and unconventional military forces and techniques, the development and use of proxy forces, as well as various techniques of irregular warfare, including assassinations and provocations. They will look closely at Ukraine before and after the Euromaidan revolution. In the end they will consider whether it is appropriate to try to encompass all of these activities within a single framework, and if not how best to understand them individually and the interrelationships among them. The question of where the phenomenon of war begins and ends within the context of a state’s general foreign and national security policy will be central to our deliberations.
War Studies Advanced Programs are open only to alumni of the basic War Studies course. These sessions are offered in the fall/winter and summer, and focus either on a national security challenge or on a historical conflict. Learn more about the War Studies Program.
Image courtesy Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation
Frederick Kagan testifies on the Russian challenge
Faculty
Nataliya Bugayova
Nataliya Bugayova is a Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), where she leads the Russia and Ukraine portfolio. Her work focuses on the Kremlin’s foreign policy decision-making and ongoing global campaigns. Prior to ISW, she was the Chief Executive Officer of the Kyiv Post, Ukraine’s independent English-language publication.
Nataliya Bugayova
Nataliya Bugayova is a Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), where she leads the Russia and Ukraine portfolio. Her work focuses on the Kremlin’s foreign policy decision-making and ongoing global campaigns. She was previously ISW’s Development Director from 2016-2019. focuses She led the ISW Development team’s efforts and the planning for major events, including the ISW Security Conference.
Prior to ISW, she was the Chief Executive Officer of the Kyiv Post, Ukraine’s independent English-language publication. She also served as Chief of Staff to former Ukrainian Economy Minister Pavlo Sheremeta, appointed after the pro-democracy Euromaidan Revolution in February 2014. She also advised Minister Sheremeta on cooperation with international financial institutions, focusing primarily on the World Bank. She has worked on consulting projects with the World Bank in Washington, D.C. and with the Boston Consulting Group in Kyiv.
She obtained a Master’s in Public Policy from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. She was a student fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. She earned her undergraduate degree in East Asian Studies at Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University.
James M. Dubik
LTG James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War and a Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. General Dubik has extensive operational experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Bosnia, Haiti, Panama, and in many NATO countries.
James M. Dubik
LTG James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War and a Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. General Dubik has extensive operational experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Bosnia, Haiti, Panama, Honduras, and in many NATO countries.
His last job on active duty was as Commanding General of the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq during the Surge of 2007–2008. He is a member of the U.S. Army Ranger Hall of Fame and a distinguished member of the U.S. Army 75th Ranger Regiment.
General Dubik taught Philosophy at West Point and Campaign Theory and Practice at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has completed an MIT fellowship program for national security studies as well as executive programs in national security at Harvard’s JFK School of Government and Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. He is the author, most recently, of Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory.
He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Philosophy from Gannon University, Erie, Pennsylvania; a Masters in Military Arts and Sciences from the Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Johns Hopkins University.
Frederick W. Kagan
Frederick W. Kagan is a Senior Instructor with the Hertog War Studies Program at the Institute for the Study of War. The author of the 2007 report “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq,” he is one of the intellectual architects of the successful “surge” strategy in Iraq. He is the Director of AEI’s Critical Threats Project.
Frederick W. Kagan
Frederick W. Kagan is a Senior Instructor with the Hertog War Studies Program at the Institute for the Study of War. The author of the 2007 report “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq,” he is one of the intellectual architects of the successful “surge” strategy in Iraq. He is the Robert H. Malott Chair and Director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).
In 2009, he served in Kabul, Afghanistan, as part of General Stanley McChrystal’s strategic assessment team, and he returned to Afghanistan in 2010, 2011, and 2012 to conduct research for Generals David Petraeus and John Allen. In July 2011, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen awarded him the Distinguished Public Service Award, the highest honor the Chairman can present to civilians who do not work for the Department of Defense, for his volunteer service in Afghanistan.
He is coauthor of the report Defining Success in Afghanistan (AEI and the Institute for the Study of War, 2010) and author of the series of reports Choosing Victory (AEI), which recommended and monitored the US military surge in Iraq. His most recent book is Lessons for a Long War: How America Can Win on New Battlefields (AEI Press, 2010, with Thomas Donnelly). Previously an associate professor of military history at West Point, Dr. Kagan is a contributing editor at the Weekly Standard and has written for Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and other periodicals.
He holds a Ph.D. from Yale University in Russian and Soviet military history.
Kimberly Kagan
Kimberly Kagan is a Senior Instructor with the Hertog War Studies Program and founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War. She is a military historian who has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yale, Georgetown, and American University.
Kimberly Kagan
Kimberly Kagan is a Senior Instructor with the Hertog War Studies Program and founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War. She is a military historian who has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yale, Georgetown, and American University.
Dr. Kagan served in Kabul for seventeen months from 2010 to 2012 working for commanders of the International Security Assistance Force, General David H. Petraeus and subsequently General John Allen. Admiral Mike Mullen, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized Dr. Kagan for this deployment as a volunteer with the Distinguished Public Service Award, the highest honor the Chairman can present to civilians who do not work for the Department of Defense.
Dr. Kagan previously served as a member of General Stanley McChrystal’s strategic assessment team, comprised of civilian experts, during his campaign review in June and July 2009. She conducted many regular battlefield circulations of Iraq between May 2007 and April 2010 while General Petraeus and General Raymond T. Odierno served as the MNF-I Commanding General.
Dr. Kagan held an Olin Postdoctoral Fellowship in Military History at Yale International Security Studies in 2004 to 2005 and was a National Security Fellow at Harvard’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies in 2002 to 2003. She received her B.A. in Classical Civilization and her Ph.D. in History from Yale University.
Preview the Syllabus by Week/Session
Block 1: Introduction to the Ukraine Conflict
Readings:
- U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014.
- US Department of Defense, “Essential Guide to Russian Hybrid Warfare: Three Studies on Putin’s Crimea Annexation, Assaults on Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, Proxy Forces and Little Green Men, NATO Strategy for Countering Threat.”
- Additional readings and videos from Nataliya Bugayova, who will teach this block.
Discussion:
We will lay out what actually happened in some detail and with some context to ensure we have a coherent understanding of the conflict. The next two blocks will dive more deeply into three of the most important aspects of Russian hybrid operations in Ukraine that are likely to be of relevance in other hybrid conflicts.
Block 2: Techniques of Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine
Readings:
- Alya Shandra and Robert Seely, The Surkov Leaks: The Inner Workings of Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine, RUSI, July 2019.
- Dailey and Parker, Soviet Strategic Deception, Introduction, Chapters 3 and 4 (“Themes of Soviet Strategic Deception and Disinformation” and “Soviet Active Measures and Democratic Culture”), Chapters 13 and 14 (“The Role of Deception in Soviet Military Planning” and “Reflexive Control in Soviet Military Planning”).
- Maria Snegovaya, “Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2015.
- Stephen Blank, “Cyber War and Information War a la Russe.”
- Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, “Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare.”
- Marie Baezner and Patrice Robin, “Cyber and Information Warfare in the Ukrainian Context.”
- Microsoft Corporation, “Strontium: A profile of a persistent and motivated adversary.”
- David Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, Chapters 1-3.
Discussion Questions:
Hybrid warfare encompasses a disparate set of tools and techniques. We will focus on three: information operations, cyber operations, and unconventional/irregular warfare operations. In the study of information and unconventional/irregular warfare operations we will consider some of the Soviet theories and practices that have shaped and influenced the development of current Russian approaches. For each of the three techniques, we will have to answer the following questions:
- What is the technique? How is it defined and what kinds of activities does it encompass?
- How is it executed? What specific means did the Soviets/Russians use?
- What purposes does it best serve?
- What factors make it more or less likely to succeed?
- How does it work together with the other techniques to achieve tactical, operational, strategic, and/or grand strategic objectives?
Block 3: Russian Theories Relating to Hybrid Warfare
Readings:
- Nataliya Bugayova, “How We Got Here with Russia: The Kremlin’s Worldview.”
- Vladimir Putin, Speech to the Munich Security Conference Plenary Session, 12 February 2007.
- Russian Federation, “FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,” 30 November 2016.
- Russian Federation Military Doctrine, 2014.
- Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian NonLinear War.”
- Frederick W. Kagan, Nataliya Bugayova, and Jennifer Cafarella, Confronting the Russian Challenge – A New Approach for the U.S.
Discussion Questions:
This block will include some discussion of the Russian worldview and will use Russian military doctrine and foreign policy concept to elucidate the Russian way of thinking about this problem. The focus will be on understanding the Gerasimov doctrine, but we will situate it in the context of Putin’s worldview, the “Primakov doctrine”, and some Soviet context.
- How does Putin diagnose the problems from which the world is suffering? How does that diagnosis compare with those offered by Gorbachev and his predecessors? How about his attitude toward war?
- Is there any replacement in these post-Soviet documents for the class struggle as a superseding conflict of which particular wars are only manifestations? How different is the 2016 Russian view of the world, its challenges, and the threats and dangers it poses to Russia from the views of Gorbachev and earlier Soviet leaders and writers?
Optional Readings:
- Khrushchev speech from January 6, 1961.
- Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, 1962, pp. 269-293 (Chapter 4: The Nature of Modern War).
- Mikhail Gorbachev, “Political Report of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Central Committee to the 27th Congress,” 1986 (published in The Challenges of our time: Disarmament and Social Progress), Chapter I, “The Contemporary World: Its Main Tendencies and Contradictions,” and Chapter IV, “Basic Aims and Directions of the Party’s Foreign Policy Strategy.”
Block 4: American Theories of Hybrid Warfare/Gray Zone Warfare
Readings:
Discussion:
The focus will be on understanding how American thinkers and practitioners have articulated their own views of hybrid/gray zone warfare independent of what they assume the Russians are thinking about it.
Block 5: American/Western Perception of Russian Theory and Practice
Readings:
- Mark Galeotti, Russian Political War: Moving Beyond the Hybrid
- Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian NonLinear War” (Review)
- Mark Galeotti, “I’m Sorry for Creating the Gerasimov Doctrine.”
- Eugene Rumer, “The Primakov (not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action.”
- Andrew Monaghan, “Putin’s Way of War: The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid War’”, 2016.
- Russia in Review: The Gerasimov Doctrine Is Here To Stay.
- Catherine Harris and Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: Russia’s Lessons Learned in Syria.”
Discussion Questions:
- How are we understanding what the Russians are doing/thinking about? How congruent or incongruent are our perceptions with what the Russians are actually saying/doing? Why are we having such an argument about it at all, and should we construe that argument as a partial success of Russian information operations?
- What seems to be at stake for Galeotti such that he is so distressed at the nature of the discussion? Does the discussion actually merit such heat?
- Rumer’s article is interesting because it highlights two challenges: drawing the boundaries of hybrid warfare and, therefore, of any particular “doctrine” or framework for it and having a civil discussion about Russian activities in the current intellectual climate. Reflect on what Rumer is upset about and, again, whether the issue merits such heat.
- How does Monaghan’s article relate to the debate? What really is the role of conventional military operations in the current Russian concept of war and/or hybrid war? Has the debate focused excessively on the unconventional aspects?
- How do the last two reports affect your view of the matter in the context of the debates considered above? Consider how different methodologies can lead to different conclusions when applied to the same data. And, again, consider what questions are actually important to advance our understanding and what debates simply generate unnecessary heat.
Block 6: Conclusion – Hybrid Warfare and Clausewitz
Discussion Questions:
- Can we devise a better framework for understanding what the Russians are doing? Does the framework matter? What is to be done?
