American Democratic Capitalism
Explore the intersection of theory and practice in our national politics, and particularly in our key economic debates.
Today’s front-burner domestic policy debates reflect three fundamental changes in American government that have been in train for several decades and have accelerated dramatically in recent years:
- The decline of Congress as a representative legislature, and the assumption of broad lawmaking powers by the Executive Branch (both the President and the numerous administrative and regulatory agencies) and Federal Reserve.
- Routine deficit spending and growing government debt, accompanied by government promotion of private borrowing for such things as home mortgages and college tuition.
- The shift of federal spending from traditional public goods (e.g., national defense, courts, and transportation infrastructure) to transfer payments to individuals (e.g., Social Security, Medicare, and other “entitlements,” and narrower programs from welfare to farm subsidies).
This course will examine the causes of these developments; their consequences for political debate, policymaking, and public welfare; and the prospects for institutional reform.
Image: “United States Capitol” by Phil Roeder | Flickr, CC BY 2.0
Christopher DeMuth on the rise of the administrative state
Faculty
Christopher DeMuth
Christopher DeMuth is a Distinguished Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. He was President of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research from 1986–2008 and D.C. Searle Senior Fellow at AEI from 2008–2011.
Christopher DeMuth
Christopher DeMuth is a Distinguished Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. He was President of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research from 1986–2008 and D.C. Searle Senior Fellow at AEI from 2008–2011.
A graduate of The Lawrenceville School, Harvard College, and the University of Chicago Law School, Mr. DeMuth was staff assistant to President Richard Nixon in 1969–1970, working on urban and environmental policy, and, during President Ronald Reagan’s first term, was administrator for information and regulatory affairs in the Office of Management and Budget and executive director of the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief. From 1976–1980, he taught at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and directed the Harvard Faculty Project on Regulation. He has also practiced law (with Sidley & Austin in Chicago and at the Consolidated Rail Corporation in Philadelphia) and been an economic consultant (with Lexecon, Inc.), and was for a time publisher and editor-in-chief of Regulation magazine (now published by the Cato Institute). He is currently a director of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and of several nonprofit organizations.
DeMuth was raised in Kenilworth, Illinois, and lives in McLean, Virginia. He and his wife, Susan DeMuth, MD, have three grown children and seven grandchildren. His writings are posted at www.ccdemuth.com.
Download the Full Syllabus
Preview the Syllabus by Week/Session
Session 1: Political Change and Legislative Decline
Readings:
- James Q. Wilson, “American Politics: Then & Now,” Commentary, February 1979, reprinted in James Q. Wilson, American Politics, Then & Now and Other Essays (2010)
- James Q. Wilson, John J. DiIulio, Jr., and Meena Bose, American Government: Institutions and Politics (13th ed., 2013), Chapter 22, “Who Governs? To What Ends?”
- Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track (2008), Chapter 5, “Institutional Decline”
Questions:
- How, according to our authors, has American politics changed during the past several decades? Do the authors give satisfactory accounts of the causes of those changes? Has politics become more or less “democratic”?
- What have been the consequences of political change for the structure and output of government? Is “institutional decline” a congressional problem or a broader phenomenon?
- Is the representative legislature obsolete? Might it be restored—and, if so, would that be desirable?
Session 2: Executive Supremacy
Readings:
- Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (2010), Introduction and Chapter 1, “The Constitutional Framework”
- Christopher DeMuth, “Our Regulatory State,” (a version of this essay appeared under the title “The Regulatory State” in National Affairs, Summer 2012)
Questions:
- Is “executive supremacy” a mirror image of “legislative decline,” or does it have independent sources?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of direct lawmaking by the President and the executive agencies? Are these primarily legal, political, or economic?
- Are the controversies over executive lawmaking likely to outlast the Obama administration and the debates over ObamaCare implementation?
Session 3: Debt and Democracy
Readings:
- John J. DiIulio, Jr., “Facing Up to Big Government,” National Affairs, Spring 2012
- George P. Shultz, et al., “The Magnitude of the Mess We’re In,” Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2012
- Christopher DeMuth, “The Real Cliff,” The Weekly Standard, December 24, 2012
- John F. Cogan, “Federal Budget,” The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, 1991
- Henry J. Aaron, “Where is the Urgency on the Debt Ceiling?” Yahoo Finance, January 9, 2013
Questions:
- How has the nature of the debt problem changed over American history? Does “big government” require “big debt”? Is the debt a partisan issue where the interests of political liberals and conservatives conflict?
- How is today’s high government debt related to the issues discussed in previous sessions—political change, legislative decline, and executive supremacy?
- If the major entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare are running surpluses (with annual program revenues exceeding expenditures), how can they be said to be an important part of the debt problem?
Session 4: The Growth of Transfer Government
Readings:
Questions:
- Do Eberstadt’s data and arguments affect your evaluation of the debt problem discussed at the previous session?
- Would a stronger Congress, or greater checks-and-balances on the executive, or stricter controls over annual deficits, be effective solutions to Eberstadt’s “epidemic”?
- What are Galston’s objections and Levin’s elaborations to Eberstadt’s arguments? Do you find them persuasive?
Session 5: Debt by Regulation: The Financial Crisis of 2008
Readings:
- Christopher DeMuth, Government Regulation and the Financial Crisis of 2008 (2012)
- Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Final Report (Preface and Conclusions) and Dissenting Statement of Peter J. Wallison (Introduction and Summary)
- David Skeel, “A Nation Adrift from the Rule of Law,” Wall Street Journal, August 21, 2012
- C. Boyden Gray and Jim R. Purcell, “Why Dodd-Frank is Unconstitutional,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2012
Questions:
- In what respects was the financial crisis of 2008 a result of the political and institutional transformations examined in previous sessions? Has the crisis and its aftermath accentuated those transformations?
- Would greater checks and balances between Congress and the President make it easier or harder to respond to future financial crises?
